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Abstract 
Crises and exceptional situations are usually described as exogenous challenges for political leadership. Leaders are 
reactive to their political environment (structure), which strongly shapes their activity as situational and contingency 
theories of leadership emphasize it. In contrast, this paper claims that crises and exceptional situations might be 
engendered endogenously, by political agency. Relying on Kari Palonen’s differentiation between two types of 
contingency (Machiavellian and Weberian) it tries to set up a two-dimensional framework for analyzing political 
situations and types of political action. The paper provides various empirical examples (including George W. Bush’s 
leadership after 9/11 and Hungarian PM Viktor Orbán’s unorthodox crisis-management from 2010 onwards) to 
illustrate the usefulness of this framework. 
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1. Introduction 1 
Great leaders need crisis situations to gain power to (re)act (Rossiter, 1948; Genovese, 1979), but crisis situations 2 
need great leaders in order to be solved as well (Tucker, 1968, p. 745; Tucker, 1995). Generally, a crisis is seen as a 3 
pressure and an urgent threat, which leaders must survive as they adapt to the new situation. Leadership always 4 
seems to be reactive: leaders must make sense of the crisis, give it meaning, harness and shape it through their 5 
responses, give an account after a crisis and even learn lessons from it (Ansell et al., 2014; Boin et al., 2005; Boin et 6 
al., 2008; Buller & James, 2015; Genovese, 1986; Heifetz, 1998). However, from a different ontological basis 7 
constructionist/constructivist authors give more space to form the conceptions of a situation endogenously (Grint, 8 
2005; Widmaier et al., 2007). But what if these are just different types of relations between leaders and crisis 9 
situations? In this sense, there are two extreme ways to perceive and conceptualize extraordinary situations and to 10 
deal with them. On the one hand, a crisis could be seen as an exogenously given situation for leaders to manage in a 11 
technocratic or conventional way; on the other, it can be seen as a situation generated endogenously by leaders 12 
acting in an innovative way. While researchers usually explore leaders’ responses to exogenous crises, such as 13 
industrial accidents, natural catastrophes, terrorist attacks or responses to economic or international financial crises 14 
(e.g. Boin et al., 2005; Boin et al., 2008), our focus is on endogenously generated and / or shaped crises. The goal of 15 
this paper is to emphasize the role of political agency in crisis generation and to attempt a re-definition of it, 16 
something that is very much neglected by approaches focusing on structural determinants.  17 
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The problem arises from the structure–agency debate. A fundamental problem for political leadership studies is how 18 
the relationship between the political actors and the environment in which they find themselves is managed. Calls 19 
for research into the dilemma of the structure–agency problem in leadership studies are not new (Hargrove, 2004; 20 
Jones, 1989; Masciulli et al., 2009; 't Hart & Rhodes, 2014). Three different approaches can be distinguished in this 21 
debate: a structure-oriented (structuralist or determinist) approach, an agency-oriented (intentionalist or 22 
voluntarist) one, and a literature that aims to transcend this dualism.
 “
Agency” is understood as a capacity to act 23 
upon situations, as a property of actors to be able to formulate and implement decisions. On the other hand, 24 
“structure” means the situation, context and political environment. It refers to the conditions within which actors 25 
operate and seize the opportunities, and which constrain their actions. Essentially, structure and agency are two 26 
sides of the same coin, as they coexist in a political process. 27 
In a crisis situation, where leadership differs from leadership in routine times, this dualism is more problematic. In 28 
this paper we aim to contribute to this debate on the conceptual level. Relying heavily on the works of Kari Palonen 29 
(1998; 2001), we describe contingency as the nature of relations between structure and agency. Contingency can 30 
serve both as a constraint on political action (as in The Prince of Machiavelli) as well as a chance or means for such 31 
action (as in the works of Max Weber) . We take crisis, as a situation with an extraordinarily high level of 32 
contingency, to highlight this “dual nature” of contingency for political agency. (This concept, in our view, is suitable 33 
to attenuate the rigidity of the structure-agency dualism). In this paper we focus on incumbent leaders, who control 34 
crisis governments (Rossiter, 1948, p. 3; Corwin, 1978, p. 78; Kellerman, 1984, p. 71; Edinger, 1967, p. 15; Edinger, 35 
1975, p. 257); and who make things happen that would not happen otherwise (Blondel, 1987, p. 3; McFarland, 1969, 36 
p. 155; Cronin, 1980, p. 372). Based on this conceptual framework, our paper provides a general typology of 37 
contingency, i.e. the relationship between political agency (leadership) and structure/structural change (crisis), and 38 
sets out empirical examples within it.  39 
The paper is structured as follows. First, we define the concept of crisis and give a conceptual differentiation related 40 
to contingency. Second, we analyse the possible relationships between contingency and political action and 41 
differentiate between two types of contingency, drawing on Palonen’s comparison of the Machiavellian and the 42 
Weberian Moments. Third, we develop a fourfold typology of the relationship between political agency and 43 
differerent states of affairs: normalcy and three different types of crisis. Each type will be highlighted through 44 
empirical examples. Finally, we draw a few conclusions. 45 
2. Crisis and contingency 46 
First of all, we need to clarify what we mean by crisis. One of the recent papers on crisis and leadership defined the 47 
former with three criteria: threat, uncertainty, and urgency (Boin et al., 2005). By threat we mean high-stake politics, 48 
which characterizes crises, vis-a-vis low-stake politics in normal times. Urgency here means a commanding necessity 49 
of action in the case of crisis, which is absent in the case of normality, when the pressure for urgent action is not 50 
present or low. In this paper, we focus mainly on the second component, uncertainty, identifying it as a subtype of a 51 
broader concept, contingency. Contingency can mean indeterminacy (“It could be different”), or uncertainty (“We 52 
cannot know”) (Schedler, 2007). We assume that contingency is present both in states of the normal functioning of 53 
politics and in times of crisis. But while in the former it is usually indeterminacy, in crisis situations it can rather be 54 
characterized as uncertainty . The factor that distinguishes the two is the presence (in case of indeterminacy) of 55 
rules, conventions and authorities  that reduce the spectrum of possible choices. The formulation of Michael 56 
Oakeshott properly describes indeterminacy in the normal state of affairs:  57 
 58 
“But in stipulating general conditions for choosing less incidental than the choices themselves, in 59 
establishing relationships more durable than those which emerge and melt away in transactions to 60 
satisfy a succession of contingent wants, and in articulating rules and duties which are indifferent 61 
to the outcome of the actions they govern, it may be said to endow human conduct with a 62 
formality in which its contingency is somewhat abated.” (Oakeshott, 1990, p. 74) 63 
 64 
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In a crisis situation it is precisely these “rules and duties” (and conventions, authorities) that become dubious, 65 
thereby making the political situation uncertain.
1
 66 
 67 
The difference in the nature of uncertainty from that of indeterminacy can also be highlighted by the Knightian 68 
conceptual differentiation between risk and uncertainty familiar from economics. While risk is measurable and 69 
calculable (because conditions are known, as in the case of roulette or chess, or generally in the game theory), 70 
uncertainty is not (because conditions are not known, and we cannot make predictions). Therefore, it is not only the 71 
higher intensity, but the different nature of contingency that differentiates crisis situations from normal states. It is 72 
not only a higher level of contingency, but a different type of contingency that charaterizes crises. Uncertainty, 73 
rather than risk, characterizes crisis and extraordinary situations.  74 
 75 
To summarize: we have attempted to differentiate between a “softer” and a “harder” form of contingency (see 76 
Table 1) in order to distinguish the normal state of affairs from extraordinary situations. In the next section, we will 77 
try to relate the concept of contingency to that of agency. 78 
 79 
Table 1. Conceptual differentiations related to contingency 80 
contingency normal state of 
affairs 
indeterminacy risk 
crisis situation uncertainty uncertainty 
 81 
3. Palonen’s antithesis: background vs.  operative contingency
2
 82 
To establish a connection between contingency and political agency, we attempt to use a work by Kari Palonen 83 
(Palonen, 1998) as a point of departure. Palonen differentiates between the “Machiavellian Moment” (cf. Pocock, 84 
1975) and what he calls the “Weberian Moment”. His main argument, roughly summarized, is that while in the 85 
former contingency is mainly an external challenge for political action, in the latter it becomes its constitutive 86 
element. Here we try to summarize briefly the differences between these two “Moments” (see Table 2). These 87 
considerations will serve as the foundation of our typology concerning the relationship between political agency and 88 
crises. 89 
 90 
(1) The background of political action in the Machiavellian Moment is uncertain. The main problem of The Prince is 91 
the retention of principalities newly acquired through the arms of others and through good fortune. As Machiavelli 92 
emphasizes, these cases are when the situation of the rulers is the most difficult, because they cannot rely on 93 
traditional legitimacy, only on the “two most inconstant and unstable things”. The factors that would nudge  94 
uncertainty into indeterminacy are apparently missing. Contrary to that, the historical context of Weber’s work is a 95 
marked by bureaucratization, which forms a stable background to political action, abating contingency by its rules 96 
and standard procedures. 97 
 98 
                                                          
1
 This difference can be exemplified by two different uses of the same metaphor. In Michael Oakeshott’s famous 
formulation, politicians “sail a boundless and bottomless sea” where the “enterprise is to keep afloat on an even 
keel” (Oakeshott, 1991, p. 60). This can be taken as the general characterization of political activity that also applies 
in the normal state of politics.  The other use can be taken as a paradigm of crisis: politicians in crisis resemble “river 
oarsmen who [...] suddenly find themselves called upon to navigate their boat in mid-ocean” (Tocqueville, 1896, p. 
106).  
2
 Our reading here relies heavily on Kari Palonen’s distinction between Machiavelli and Weber, a distinction to be 
made clear at the end of this section. His reading, in our view, has great analytical merits, but The Prince can also be 
interpreted in a different way, i.e. as a work that supposes a more complex relationship between fortuna and virtú 
(see e.g. Pocock, 1975, pp. 156-182), or one that lays a greater emphasis on agency and character, and therefore 
rather stresses the similarities between the views of Machiavelli and Weber (see e.g. Philp, 2007, pp. 37-96). 
However, here our point of interest lies not in conceptual historical accuracy, but in analytical usefulness. 
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(2) For Machiavelli, the main threat that political action must face is the desolation of fortuna, which is compared by 99 
him to “raging rivers” in Chapter 25 of The Prince. For Weber, the main problem consists not in taming the forces of 100 
fortuna, but in avoiding the “petrification” of bureaucratic structures. Put differently: his main concern is with the 101 
possibility of politics, not with that of order (Palonen, 2001). The difference between the two authors is aptly 102 
expressed by their uses of metaphors: while Machiavelli’s prince has to erect “defences and barriers, in such a 103 
manner that, rising again, the waters may pass away by canal, and their force be neither so unrestrained nor so 104 
dangerous” (Machiavelli, 2008, Chapter 25), Weber describes politics as a “strong and slow boring of hard boards” 105 
(Weber, 2001, p. 128). The latter in Palonen’s interpretation means the opening up of new horizons for political 106 
action. 107 
 108 
(3) The first, vital task for leaders follows from the above-mentioned features. For Machiavelli’s prince, it is 109 
mantenere lo stato, that is, to maintain his power and the present form of government. There is undeniably an 110 
element of innovation in the Machiavellian view: his image of the fox (Machiavelli, 2008, Chapter 18) implies that 111 
fortuna can not only be contained, but also utilized to a certain degree, but – at least in Palonen’s interpretation – 112 
this is a secondary feature; the main concern is still with the exposedness to and the preponderance of fortuna. For 113 
Weber, the first task of a political leader is to create room for manoeuvre among bureaucratic constraints. 114 
 115 
(4) It is worth mentioning that both views of political action can take pathological forms. For Machiavelli, mantenere 116 
lo stato without some higher aims that bring glory to the prince and benefit to his subjects is detestable (cf. Skinner, 117 
2002, pp. 143-144). In the same vein, Weber is no advocate of adventurous politics that takes risks for their own 118 
sake. Although he is worried about the growth of bureaucratic influence, at the same time he also admits its 119 
importance as a stable background as far as the possibility of politics can be guaranteed. 120 
 121 
(5) As we mentioned before, the main thesis of Palonen’s book concerns the position switch of contingency. While in 122 
the Machiavellian Moment it is principally (despite the presence of the figure of the fox) external to political action, 123 
a challenge that has to be overcome, in the Weberian Moment it becomes an element of political action itself.  124 
Where the foremost danger is seen in the ravaging power of fortuna (a symbol of contingency), politics is logically 125 
directed against contingency. But in a bureaucratized world contingency is linked with freedom from the 126 
bureaucratic structure. Therefore, politicians act not against, but through contingency. 127 
 128 
(6) As the last point implicates, contingency changes from a background condition (fortuna) into an operative 129 
element. This distinction between background and operative contingency will form the basis of our analytical 130 
typology of the relationship between political action and crisis presented in the next part. 131 
 132 
Table 2. Comparison of the Machiavellian and the Weberian Moment 133 
 Machiavellian Moment Weberian Moment 
background of political 
action 
uncertain (newly acquired rule) stable (age of bureaucratization) 
main threat external shocks (fortuna) stagnation, “petrification” of 
bureaucratic structures 
main task of the leader assure security and order 
(metaphor: erecting “defences and 
barriers”) 
create room for manoeuvre (metaphor: 
“boring of hard boards”) 
pathological form mere defence of the status quo constant subversion, irresponsible 
action that endangers the state  
connection between action 
and contingency 
acting against contingency (politics 
= Spiel gegen die Kontingenz) 
acting through contingency (politics = 
Spiel durch die Kontingenz) 
types of contingency background contingency 
(Kontingenz des Handelns) 
operative contingency 
(Kontingenz im Handeln) 
4. An analytical matrix and empirical examples 134 
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Up to this point, we have claimed that (1) a crisis situation is marked by the presence of a subtype of contingency: 135 
uncertainty; and (2) that contingency can be both the background condition and a constitutive element of political 136 
agency. In this section, first, we will set up an analytical typology of the relationship between political agency and 137 
crisis, thereby interrelating the two above-mentioned conceptual distinctions. Second, we will give empirical 138 
examples to make our typology more plausible. Our focus will be on the working of operative contingency through 139 
re-interpretation of a hitherto exogenous understanding of crisis (quadrant C) and through endogenous crisis-140 
generation by creative political agency (quadrant D). Although there are no clear cases, we hope our examples will 141 
help to clarify the difference between operative and background contingency. 142 
 143 
The conceptual analysis of contingency by Palonen provides an appropriate starting point to construct an analytical 144 
typology of the relationship between political agency and crisis.
 
 The two types of contingency form the two 145 
dimensions of the matrix in table 3. As mentioned before, we assume – following Oakeshott – that there is 146 
contingency in every political situation. However, where both types of contingency are low, we can speak of a 147 
normal state of affairs (quadrant A). Here conventions (using the term in the broadest sense, including the usual 148 
procedures, behavioural patterns of politicians, the legal order etc.) are challenged neither by an exogenous shock 149 
nor by political agents. In the three other quadrants, the sum of the two types of contingency are higher; therefore 150 
in these cases we can speak of crisis situations. 151 
 152 
A high level of background contingency is present in quadrants B and C. By background contingency we mean events 153 
that cast doubt on conventions and which are exogenous from the point of view of the political agent.
3
 The best 154 
examples of exogenous shocks are a global economic crisis, a natural catastrophe, or a declaration of war by another 155 
country.  156 
 157 
Sense- and meaning-making in crisis situations always have an important role. But when rules and norms are in 158 
doubt, the interpretation of the situation by political leaders gains extraordinary importance (cf. Hall, 1993; Boin et 159 
al., 2005; Boin et al., 2008), which enhances the role of leadership and political agency. When there is a crisis, 160 
leadership always has a choice, in an analytical sense, between attempting to read events within the frame of the 161 
existing paradigm, thus trying to reduce contingency immediately, and challenging them and presenting a new 162 
paradigm that offers a new meaning of what is going on. Therefore, quadrants B and C can be seen as two different 163 
strategies for “crisis exploitation” (Boin et al., 2008), articulated at the level of political theory. The main difference 164 
between our approach and previously cited literature on crisis management is that we take into account the 165 
possibility of political actors deliberately increasing the stakes (threat), contingency (uncertainty), and the state of 166 
emergency (urgency) in a crisis situation, for example through political actions or interpretation. We assume that the 167 
type of crisis mostly depends on interpretation, meaning-making, therefore a crisis triggered by an exogenous factor 168 
might be brought either into quadrant B or into quadrant C by political agency (redefinition). Endogenous crisis 169 
generation in quadrant D, however, is a case in which crisis is not just interpreted or re-defined, but invented.
4
  170 
 171 
Table 3. Typology of the relationship between political agency and crisis 172 
 173 
                                                          
3
 Here, we stick once again to Palonen, adopting the viewpoint of “politics-as-activity” instead of “politics-as-sphere” 
(Palonen, 2003; Palonen, 2014). Acts of other political actors and consequences of their acts are exogenous to a 
concrete political actor in an activity-view, while they would be endogenous within the “sphere of politics”. 
4
 Our approach can be considered as a constructivist viewpoint, which while not ruling out differences between 
types of crises concerning their interpretability, assumes that all of them can be shaped by interpretation to a 
certain degree. 
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Unlike quadrants A and B, an elevated level of operative contingency is present in quadrants C and D. We speak of 174 
operative contingency when the political actor deliberately acts or speaks in such a way as to heighten the level of 175 
uncertainty, e.g. by questioning conventions or conventional authorities, the existing legal order, etc. The latter 176 
often entails a paradigm change (Hall, 1993; cf. Blyth, 2013)
5
, i.e. a dramatic change in policy-making, comparing to 177 
policy adjustment (change of settings) or policy reforms (change of instruments, institutions).  178 
 179 
In what follows, each type of relationship between political agency and crisis will be explored and a few examples 180 
will be provided to highlight the main features thereof.  181 
4.1. Quadrant A: normal state of affairs 182 
Quadrant A represents the normal state of affairs, when both background and operative contingency is low, or 183 
“normal”. No shock or crisis happens, there is no threat to institutions or conventions, and there is no exceptional 184 
time-pressure for decisions and actions in the political process. Government policies typically change only slowly and 185 
incrementally through adjustment to the policy line of the incumbents or as reactions to the changing circumstances 186 
of the given policy area. The changes in the political process are usually not evenly distributed, therefore even the 187 
“normal” level of contingency is not a constant, but a fluctuating phenomenon. For example, the democratic 188 
                                                          
5
 Drawing on Hall, by paradigm we mean an interpretative framework of policymaking. “Policymakers customarily 
work within a framework of ideas and standards that specifies not only the goals of policy and the kind of 
instruments that can be used to attain them, but also the very nature of the problems they are meant to be 
addressing”, states Hall (1993, p. 279.). Policy-paradigm is a lense for perceiving problems, a way of cognition of the 
world and an attitude to the potential modes of dealing with it. Hence, by paradigm change we mean the change of 
the hierarchy of overarching goals guiding policy.  
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A - normal state of affairs 
1. no shock / crisis 
2. contingency mainly indeterminacy 
3.  no exceptional time-stress for decisions and 
actions  
4. no threat to norms, institutions, conventions 
5. innovation is not needed 
6. main goal of actors: to follow their aims within 
the given institutional framework 
 
B -  crisis as exogenous shock 
1. crisis situation: exogenous shock 
2.  contingency mainly uncertainty 
3.  exceptional time-stress for decisions and 
actions 
4. institutions are threatened, but they are 
defended through adjustment 
5. innovation is not needed,  conventional crisis 
management is applied 
6. main goal of the actor: to immediately reduce 
the level of contingency, overcome exogenous 
shock 
 
D -  endogenously generated crisis 
1. crisis situation: endogenously generated crisis,  
no external shock 
2.   contingency mainly uncertainty,   increased to 
a high level through agency 
3. exceptional time-stress generated by deliberate 
actions 
4. institutions are rebuilt or exchanged for new 
ones 
5. innovation: questioning of conventions and 
conventional authorities 
6. main goal of the actor: to widen her/his room 
for manoeuvre through  increasing the level of 
contingency 
 
C -  crisis re-defined 
1. crisis situation: exogenous shock and 
endogenous crisis-generation through 
reinterpretation 
2.  contingency mainly uncertainty 
3.  exceptional time-stress for decisions and 
actions 
4. institutions are threatened, and they are 
restructured through deliberate action 
5. innovative crisis-management: questioning of 
conventions and conventional authorities 
6. main goal of the actor: to increase or maintain 
the level of contingency at a level manageable by 
herself/himself 
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succession of rulers usually increases the level of contingency, because early, and even regular elections cause 189 
indeterminacy in domestic politics. However, it is within the “normal” level of contingency which prevails in the 190 
parliamentary form of goverment. In other words, “rules and duties”, norms and convention are not usually under 191 
threat in these cases. Uncertainty is limited to the composition of the next parliament or government. Although 192 
there may be changes in public policies, so contingency may rise to a higher level compared to the periods between 193 
two elections, this is expected and accepted as “normal” and falls within the boundaries of the predictable way of  194 
policy change in parliamentary regimes. One example of the remarkable presence of contingency in the normal state 195 
of affairs is the French Fourth Republic up to the 1958 crisis.
6
 In one of the most penetrating recent French histories 196 
Marcel Merle (1999, pp. 975–976.) argues that under this regime  197 
“governmental instability did not always result in political instability *…+ Governmental instabilities 198 
were mainly part of a relative continuity, almost making governmental crises into a means of 199 
governing”. 200 
In his account, the collapse of the Fourth Republic was due not to the frequent governmental changes, but to the 201 
regime’s inability to decide in colonial issues.  202 
4.2. Quadrant B: crisis as exogenous shock 203 
In quadrant B of our crisis typology, the exogenous shock that seems to question standard practices and policies is 204 
managed by the conventional means of crisis management. The political aim is to reduce contingency immediately. 205 
This could seem paradoxical, though only at first sight: although exogenous shocks always seem to cast doubt on 206 
conventional authorities and/or standard policy-lines, the nature and the gravity of the crisis is not self-evident, but 207 
open to debate and contestation. Crisis managers in quadrant B interpret the crisis as an anomaly rather than a 208 
systemic problem, which justifies their reliance on conventional means of crisis management.  209 
 210 
Exogenous shocks, disasters and terrorist attacks all demand that leaders act immediately. We provide examples of 211 
prime ministers who had to face an economic crisis, a terrorist attack, and a natural catasthrope, respectively.   212 
 213 
The best example of the strategy of technocratic or “crisis-managing” governments (McDonell & Valbruzzi, 2014) is 214 
that of Mario Monti in Italy. Monti was asked to form a new government after Berlusconi’s resignation on 12 215 
November 2011. The ultimate purpose of Monti’s technocratic government was to manage the Eurozone debt crisis 216 
in Italy. The main political parties in the Senate and Chamber of Deputies approved Monti’s emergency austerity 217 
measures (increased taxes, labour market and pension reform) to steer Italy out of worsening economic conditions 218 
and to restore market confidence and financial stability. Although he promised to step down after the passing of the 219 
2012 Budget, he launched a centrist and liberal party called Civic Choice to run for election. 220 
 221 
Spanish Prime Minister Jose María Aznar and his ruling Popular Party (PP) were challenged immediately before 222 
national elections (14 March 2004) by a series of bomb explosions on four trains heading to one of Madrid’s main 223 
stations which killed 192 people and wounded 1,430. Until 11 March the governing party had held a comfortable 5 224 
percent lead in the polls over rivals. Although the response of government was quick enough, the government 225 
misinterpreted the crisis situation and lost the “meaning-making race”. The ruling party blamed the Basque 226 
separatist movement, ETA (Euskadi ta Askatasuna) for the terrorist attacks and, instead of facing the facts, doggedly 227 
kept to this narrative to the very end. The left-wing opposition Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) easily 228 
managed to replace the official storyline with its own version, in which the bomb attacks were regarded a 229 
“punishment” by Al-Qaeda for military involvement in the Iraq war (even though the troops were sent on only a 230 
peacekeeping mission). After mass demonstrations with 11 million people (out of a population of 42 million) the PP 231 
lost the election (Olmeda, 2008). 232 
 233 
By contrast, in a similar situation German social democrat Chancellor Gerhard Schröder faced the “flood of a 234 
century” which cost 9 billion euros and more than 128,000 helpers got involved. Six weeks before the federal 235 
                                                          
6
 The First Republic in Italy (1948–1992) can be a similar example for contingency as normal state of affairs. 
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election and right before the flash flood in eastern Germany the polls gave the center-right opposition (CDU) a lead 236 
and a marginal majority for the red–green coalition. The Elbe flash flood changed the picture and resulted in the re-237 
election of Schröder. At very early stage of the disaster the federal government reacted effectively and provided 238 
financial aid for the Lands hit by the catasthrope. Moreover it eased the pressure on incumbents to manage the 239 
existing high budget deficit. (Bytzek, 2008) Due to positional asymmetry Edmund Stoiber supported by CSU/CDU was 240 
unable to keep up with Schröder or to bid high enough, and Schröder was re-elected  241 
4.3. Quadrant C: crisis re-defined 242 
In quadrant C, the levels of both the background contingency and the operational contingency are high. That means: 243 
the political actor responds to an external shock not by applying conventional countermeasures, but instead the 244 
incumbent may “raise the stakes”, interpreting the current circumstances not as an anomaly but as a systemic 245 
failure. It is important to note that this means not merely the rhetorical device of emphasizing or exaggerating the 246 
gravity of the crisis. That approach is always followed by the reassurance that we know the way out of crisis – which 247 
means: the situation is a serious one, but still just an anomaly, which can be cured by the application of the 248 
appropriate, routine familiar medicine. Instead of this strategy, our politician in quadrant C (1) dramatizes the crisis 249 
in a more systematic way, and (2) couples this dramatization with the questioning of the prevailing policy-paradigm 250 
(Hall, 1993) or dominant public philosophy (Mehta, 2011) as well as the conventional authorities. To adopt a 251 
metaphor used earlier: while the politician in quadrant B resembles a captain of a ship trying to escape the stormy 252 
conditions as quickly as possible, those in quadrants C and D consider the possibility that a storm is not necessarily a 253 
bad condition from the viewpoint of the captain. In cases C and D leaders aim to create and/or maintain a high level 254 
of contingency, which can be mastered only by themselves (cf. Schabert, 1989). 255 
 256 
We have three examples below for quadrant C: the change in course of British foreign policy strategy from Neville 257 
Chamberlain to Winston Churchill between 1938–40; the change of the American foreign- and security policy 258 
doctrine triggered by the 9/11 crisis by President G. W. Bush; and the unorthodox economic crisis-management of 259 
the extravagant Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán. 260 
 261 
Our first example is a contra-factual one. Winston Churchill fought – unsuccessfully – for a new British foreign policy-262 
paradigm vis-a-vis Neville Chamberlain during the time of the Munich agreement in 1938. Unlike Chamberlain, 263 
Churchill realized years before that the conventional British foreign policy approach did not work in the case of Adolf 264 
Hitler. In his  speech in the House of Commons 5 October 1938 Churchill dramatized the Czechoslovak crisis and 265 
questioned the prevailing British foreign policy.
7
 He claimed that it was not possible to preserve peace in Europe by 266 
giving concessions to the Nazi leader, such as sacrificing Czechoslovakia. Instead of appeasement to Hitler, i.e. the 267 
immediate reduction of background contingency, Churchill intended a pro-active and determined British foreign 268 
policy, such as taking a clear stand for the independence of Czechoslovakia, building a new alliance in Europe against 269 
Hitler, and the rearmament of Britain, even if it increased uncertainty and worried the British public. Churchill opted 270 
for raising operative contingency, because he realized that conflict or war against Nazi Germany was not about 271 
gaining or losing certain territories or losing influence in a specific part of Europe, but had a much higher stake: it 272 
was about freedom and the way of life cherished by the British people and the West. The real paradigm-shift in 273 
British policy, however, happened only two years later, when Churchill replaced Chamberlain as prime minister. 274 
 275 
The second example for quadrant C is the 9/11 attack, which shook the American nation and created a crisis 276 
atmosphere for years. The rally round the flag effect provided unprecedented support for G. W. Bush in his new, war 277 
president role (Eichenberg et al., 2006; Hetherington & Nelson, 2003): he became temporarily charismatic 278 
(Greenstein, 2008). President Bush gave a determined policy-answer, by setting up new authorities and agencies 279 
(Department of Homeland Security) as well as by passing through new legislation (US Patriot Act) and by using 280 
                                                          
7
 Churchill’s Speeches: The Munich Agreement. October 5, 1938. House of Commons. 
http://www.winstonchurchill.org/resources/speeches/1930-1938-the-wilderness/the-munich-agreement 
(10.06.2015) 
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Presidential War Power, based on Constitutional tradition but also legitimized by Congressional authorization acts. 281 
The 9/11 attack was conventionally interpreted as an exogenous challenge which caused a so-called 282 
“incomprehensible crisis” (Boin et al., 2008, p. 19.), and which provided the incumbent with a relatively wide space 283 
for political interpretation and framing. The “War on Terror”, and the “Axis of evil” were original frames for the Bush 284 
Doctrine, which turned out to be a new policy-paradigm – it introduced a new era in the American foreign- and 285 
security policy and in international relations. The new policy included the concept of pre-emptive strikes, 286 
unilateralism and democratic regime change, which has some antecedents in American exceptionalism (Nagan & 287 
Hammer 2004). Bush transformed and extended his role as war president and turned it into an extensive executive 288 
unilateralism, using for example presidential signing statements extensively to suspend the application of 289 
Congressional laws in public administration (Galvin, 2009). The global “War on Terror” aimed to reduce background 290 
contingency. But the preventive military actions against terrorist suspects, the surveillance and detainment, the 291 
invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, the replacement of a multilateral policy in international relations with unilateral US 292 
dominance (which caused a dissensus even within NATO) meant the increase of operative contingency in world 293 
politics. Bush continuously raised the stakes, but by 2005–06 he lost support within Congress, was challenged by the 294 
Supreme Court, and for the last years of his presidency he became a lame duck. 295 
 296 
Our third example is the Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán’s unorthodox financial policy from 2010 onwards. 297 
In contrast to the conventional crisis-management of his predecessor, Gordon Bajnai, Orbán provided an 298 
unorthodox policy to stabilize the budget and to finance the sovereign debt. After his party Fidesz achieved a 299 
landslide victory, gaining 53 % of the votes and more than two-thirds of the parliamentary seats in the 2010 general 300 
elections, Orbán used the opportunity to radically re-interpret both the nature of crisis and the suitable crisis-301 
management. He framed his parliamentary “supermajority” in a quasi-revolutionary context (“revolution in the 302 
polling-booths”) and relying on it he launched a new regime. As newly elected Prime Minister, first he introduced a 303 
dramatic crisis narrative (e.g. he compared Hungary to Greece) and applied new, innovative instruments to respond 304 
to the crisis. Although Orbán kept the budget deficit below 3 % of GDP, which was a requirement of the European 305 
Union, he challenged a few conventional policy measures and questioned conventional authorities. In one 306 
parliamentary speech he announced:  307 
“There is no one to copy, no example to follow. At this moment, there are no ready and useful 308 
textbooks, at best their contours are being sketched. The new recipes have to be invented by us, 309 
during our everyday struggles. It’s a sweaty job.”
8
 310 
Orbán inserted the problem of budget deficit and indebtedness into a broader crisis narrative in an innovative way. 311 
In this narrative he combined first, the international financial crisis of 2008, second, the domestic political crisis 312 
triggered by the former socialist Prime Minister, Gyurcsány’s Őszöd “lying speech” in 2006 (which was accompanied 313 
with enduring anti-government demonstrations and street violence), and third, the transformation in the world 314 
economy (globalized financial capitalism) and the decline of the European Union in a global context. Reframing the 315 
financial crisis from an exogenous to endogenous phenomenon, Orbán was able to instrumentalize the crisis to 316 
blame the left, the liberals, and international organizations like the IMF, and successfully legitimized the 317 
revolutionary measures he implemented after getting into power. Through his “freedom fight” Orbán refused to 318 
take new parts of the IMF credit line, and refused to accept the IMF and the EU advice on what fiscal and economic 319 
policy should be followed. Instead of reducing contingency through implementing the advised adjustment and 320 
policy-reforms accompanied by a new IMF loan, Orbán adopted a more risk-taking policy in financing sovereign 321 
debt. But this way, being freed from the control of international financial authorities (the IMF), Orbán gained a wider 322 
room for manoeuvre in domestic politics.
9
 Orbán framed his endeavours to reclaim Hungary’s sovereignty vis-a-vis 323 
                                                          
8
 Speech for Urgent and Topical Issues Debate, 24 October 2011.  
http://parlament.hu/internet/plsql/ogy_naplo.naplo_fadat?p_ckl=39&p_uln=122&p_felsz=10&p_szoveg=v%E1ls%E
1g&p_felszig=10 (10.06.2015) 
9
 His revolutionary measures included crisis taxes on sectors like banking, telecommunication, or commercial 
industry, or reducing utility prices, but also a massive state intervention even in market and property relations, 
changing the relation between state and society and drafting and voting on a constitution. 
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multinational firms, international financial institutions and banks as well as institutions such as the IMF and the EU. 324 
Conflicts with such actors increased uncertainty further, and this was exacerbated by the opening to the East and to 325 
Russia, which was detrimental to relations with the USA, though it ensured political support from Hungarians with 326 
strong national feelings. However, deepening conflicts and increasing contingency by political agency was a 327 
stratagem to create advantages in domestic politics. Therefore instead of bringing back the normalcy of the pre-328 
crisis era, Orbán applied extraordinary measures on a permanent base. Instead of applying pure policy-adjustment 329 
to restore the situation ex ante, he developed new policies but also a wider political paradigm
10
 and successfully 330 
mobilized people to support it among the electorate. By and large, Orbán can be regarded an example of a politician 331 
who played not only against (background) contingency, but through (operative) contingency at the same time. In his 332 
2014 Tusványos speech Orbán revealed his attitude towards contingency (as evidence for his view, he both 333 
mentions external shocks and policy measures of his government):  334 
“we are living in a world in which anything can happen. [...] it is practically impossible to forecast 335 
events precisely or within an insignificant margin of error.”
11
 336 
4.4. Quadrant D: endogenously generated crisis 337 
In quadrant D there is no exogenous shock; the crisis is generated endogenously by political actors to broaden their 338 
room for manoeuvre. The endogenous crisis is not as obvious or tangible, so we will provide four examples to 339 
highlight the main features of it.  340 
 341 
As an extreme case, the arson attack on the Reichstag building in Berlin on 27 February 1933 was used by NSDAP to 342 
broaden the space for maneouver. The fire served as justification for passing an emergency decree (Article 48 of the 343 
Weimar Constitution, Enabling Act) curtailing civil liberties and arresting members of the rival Communist Party. 344 
These were the first steps in constructing a new political settlement. 345 
 346 
In his seminal work Stephen Skowronek (1997) formulated the conception of reconstructive leaders, who come to 347 
power in an unexpected break from a long-established political order, and each introduces new political interests, 348 
almost a new system of governmental control.
12
 One of Skowronek’s (1997, pp. 130-154) examples is Andrew 349 
Jackson. After the chaos of the presidential election of 1824, Jackson gained a sweeping victory in 1828 and 350 
launched a new era in US politics. His legacy was not just the founding of the modern electoral mechanism of the 351 
Democratic Party and thus the galvanizing of the two-party system; he also he also redefined the nature of 352 
government, weakened legislative supremacy, recreated the political foundations of the executive office and recast 353 
the system of bureaucracy. Our third example is the “constitutional game” played by French president Charles de 354 
Gaulle in 1962 (Gaffney, 2010, pp. 40–44.). By this year he had solved the Algerian question (though with a policy 355 
switch, rather than the way he promised), and the rebellion of the army was also not an issue anymore. In terms of 356 
our categories: the elevated level of background contingency that brought de Gaulle to power in 1958 was gone, the 357 
normal state of affairs seemed to be returning. In this political environment, he began to “stir up the calm waters” 358 
around himself. Firstly, he alienated his pro-European political allies (the Christian democratic MRP party) with his 359 
                                                          
10
 Instead of policy-paradigm (Hall, 1993), which refers to a specific policy field, we can speak about an ideological or 
general political paradigm in Orbán’s case, which includes the change in political thinking and philosophy of 
government in a more general sense. 
11
 Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s Speech at the 25th Bálványos Summer Free University and Student Camp 
http://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-orban-s-
speech-at-the-25th-balvanyos-summer-free-university-and-student-camp (19.07.2015.) 
12
 In his typology, two main dimensions of variables are set up. Firstly, the previous regime’s established 
commitments could be vulnerable or resilient. Secondly, president’s political identity could be either opposed or 
affiliated to the pre-established regime. “The leadership project of the opposition leader is to challenge the received 
agenda, perhaps to displace it completely with another; the leadership project of the affiliated leader is to continue, 
perhaps to complete, the work on that agenda.” (1997, 76) 
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provocative anti-European speech on 15 May. His motives were clear: de Gaulle had a different vision of the republic 360 
to both his allies and his opposition. As Gaffney puts it: “1962 was a dramatic showdown between de Gaulle wanting 361 
to reinforce personality politics and almost everyone else trying to dedramatize the republic” (Gaffney, 2010, pp. 362 
42). His strategy was to “move away from some forms of support, to move towards new policy positions” (Gaffney, 363 
2010, p. 41). The second step in this process was the announcement of a referendum on the direct election of the 364 
president.
 
 After every party apart from his own united and overturned de Gaulle’s prime minister, he dissolved the 365 
National Assembly, and scheduled the new elections after the referendum. He approached the people in an 366 
unconstitutional manner: “There was no basis in his own constitution for what he was doing; what he was doing was 367 
asserting the centrality of his own action” (Gaffney, 2010, p. 42).
13
 At the end, he clearly won his self-arranged 368 
showdown, triumphing both at the referendum and at the following elections. He successfully used operative 369 
contingency to ram through and solidify his political vision. 370 
 371 
The fourth example for quadrant D is Viktor Orbán’s constitution-making and constitutional policy in Hungary 372 
between 2010 and 2014, which is an illuminating case for endogenous crisis-generation. But what counts as 373 
extraordinary in constitutional politics? Constitution-making is extraordinary by definition, since it means changing 374 
the “rules of the game”, when the usually invisible pouvoir constituent (constitution-making power), i.e. the political 375 
sovereign, comes to the fore to be activated (Ackerman, 1998). This exceptional power, however, is supposed to 376 
withdraw and give way to normal politics again, after it has done its work. Therefore, constitutional politics is also a 377 
form of extraordinary situations, like crisis, when the existing norms, institutions and rules are under threat, a high 378 
level of contingency is present, and therefore there is an urgency to re-establish stability according to the scheduled 379 
new order. However, the extraordinary qualities of constitution-making – threat, contingency and urgency – can be 380 
reduced to a minimum, if it is carried out by an inclusive political consensus of the major political actors, elite groups 381 
and other stakeholders.
14
 This way, constitution-making can be tamed: contingency is reduced and it is pushed back 382 
to the world of normal politics, i.e. to quadrant A in our typology. The constitutional policy of Orbán, however, was 383 
far from this “domesticated”, consensual version of policy-making. The unilateral constitutional changes and the 384 
accompanying legislation modified the balance of powers, curtailed the power of control institutions like the 385 
Constitutional Court and the ombudsman, weakened the independence of the judiciary and introduced a more 386 
majoritarian electoral system. It also changed the relation between state and society and weakened the separation 387 
of Church and State. All of these changes, which were carried out in a style of emergency legislation, threatened the 388 
social and political status quo of post-communist politics, and questioned the conventions and conventional 389 
authorities of the post-1990 Hungarian regime. This constitutional revolution was neither the consequence of an 390 
external shock, nor that of a deep internal constitutional crisis. It was endogenously generated by Orbán’s creative 391 
political leadership and framing of the situation. Through the policy of permanent constitutional amendments and 392 
legislative dumping Orbán kept the level of contingency high and widened his room for manoeuvre to such a great 393 
extent as was unprecedented in Hungary since the 1989–90 democratic transition. 394 
4. Conclusions 395 
This paper aimed to investigate the relation between contingency and political agency. Institutions, including norms, 396 
conventions and even the Zeitgeist are usually regarded as constraints of agency. In crisis, however, institutions 397 
become malleable and may be shaped by political agency. What is an institutional constraint for most political 398 
actors, is often formed and generated through operative contingency by political agency, as our examples for 399 
endogenous crisis-generation and the re-definition of the crisis confirmed. Contingency too can be both a problem 400 
to overcome or a means of political action. To increase contingency instead of defending stability contradicts our 401 
usual expectation of political leaders. Why, in fact, do creative leaders increase contingency? As we have seen, to 402 
increase contingency might have strategic purposes, such as: to widen their room for manoeuvre; to question the 403 
prevailing policy-paradigm or dominant public philosophy and to offer a new paradigm of interpretation of crisis; to 404 
                                                          
13
 This unconstitutional strategy clearly separates the case from quadrant A. De Gaulle’s strategy clearly transgressed 
the normal state of affairs. 
14
 A consensual constitution-making can be a long-lasting process, where there is time for deliberation and/or 
bargaining of the parties, in order to reduce contingency and threat. 
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de-legitimize or blame conventional authorities; to offer / apply a new kind of crisis-management; to restructure 405 
power relations. 406 
 407 
The role of contingency depends on the abilities and goals of the political actor who faces the crisis situation (or 408 
creates one). Technocrats, like Monti, were trying  to “erect defences and barriers” against fortuna, while the agency 409 
of de Gaulle, G. W. Bush or Orbán can rather be characterized as “boring the hard boards” of the institutional 410 
arrangement, economic conventions, and authorities. As we saw in their cases, political leaders can not only utilize 411 
the higher level of contingency to create a new arrangement (a new state of normalcy) shaped to their wants; they 412 
can also try to incorporate an elevated level of contingency into everyday politics, making the state of exception 413 
permanent.  414 
 415 
This paper aimed to contribute to the field at two levels. First, at the conceptual level we aimed to overcome, or at 416 
least to alleviate, the stark distinction between structure and agency through the concept of contingency. 417 
Contingency, as we have seen, can be a constraining element of the structure that forces the politician to take a 418 
certain course of action (background contingency). But at the same time it can become operative, if the political 419 
actor wants and is able to take risk (Weber), or continually makes order and recreates chaos (Schabert, 1989). The 420 
views of Schabert and Weber point toward a “monist” understanding of political action, where contingency 421 
permeates everything and where it is both the barrier to and an element of agency. This view can be contrasted with 422 
the “dualist view”, where structures and agency are starkly separated, and contingency is a feature of the structure, 423 
and the only task of political agency can be to abate it.  424 
 425 
Second, at empirical level we aimed to contribute to the ordering of empirical cases of leadership in crises or 426 
extraordinary situations. In table 3 we differentiated between three types of crises. The first one (quadrant B) 427 
contains crisis as an exogenous shock, where technocratic or conventional measures characterize the response. 428 
Crisis may be highly unexpected, but it does not “surpass and defy existing political–bureaucratic repertoires of crisis 429 
prevention and response” (Boin et al., 2008, p. 289). The second one (quadrant C) refers to crisis re-defined by 430 
political agency. The political actor is a “prince of chaosmos” (Schabert, 1989), although not entirely in the 431 
Schabertian sense. Here the chaotic does not apply to the structure of government, but to the circumstances 432 
threatening the political (or economic) order. One of the two common points is that agency (leadership) has to 433 
create some kind of order, e.g. a different kind of order through interpretation, as we saw in the case of Churchill, G. 434 
W. Bush and the unorthodox crisis management of Orbán. The other common point is that agency has to confuse 435 
that order and create chaos to be able to lead. The latter feature characterizes the third type of crisis (quadrant D), 436 
which is the “most Weberian” one. The endogenously generated crisis has been illustrated above by Hitler, Andrew 437 
Jackson, de Gaulle and Orbán, as founders of new constitutional regimes. 438 
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